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China has in recent years embarked on a fresh policy of close
cooperation with her former antagonists, the Western countries, not
only in economic areas, but also on social, military and political
issues.

Does

this

mean

that

China

has

given

up

her

highly

publicized third world position? Or did China ever genuinely belong
with the third world in the past? These questions are explored in
the thesis through careful analyses of the origins of China's
foreign policies as well

as comparative observations

of their

applications to different countries at different stages. Rather
than

isolating

individual

variables,

as

some

writers

do,

in

measuring their impact on the outcome of China's policy, this study
takes a

contextual approach,

combining normative analysis with

empirical observation,
perspectives.

It

and blending historical and contemporary

concludes

that

China's

differentiation

of

international political forces should not suggest that China was
identifying herself permanently with any one of them, but rather
was simply adopting a dialectical approach toward world politics.
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Pref ace

The intrinsic dialecticism of social science has bedevilled
attempts

to

explain

China's

foreign

policy

behavior

from

a

particular point of view. on the one hand, it is relatively easy to
demonstrate the motivations behind Chinese policies by isolating
the individual factors such as communist ideological aspirations,
strategic calculations,

or historical

legacies that

shape the

policies. On the other hand, due to the complex nature of China's
foreign policy process and the delicate relationships between the
influencing factors, an analysis that is less than comprehensive is
doomed

to

failure.

As

the

case

of

the

three

world

doctrine

indicates, China's foreign policy process is just like those of
other

nations,

determined

by

internal

as

well

as

external

situations, and shaped by ideological as well as non-ideological
aspirations.
This thesis rejects the traditional methods that categorize
China's foreign policy, either as one of Marxist revolutionism that
seeks

to

destroy

capitalism by

violence

or

one

of

classical

expansionism that derives its source from China's past imperialism.
Instead,

it

incorporates

the

analysis

and

examines the

impact of each variable that forms

China's

foreign

policies

methods

in context.
v

of

normative-empirical

After a

brief

survey in

Chapter I of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the current
modes of study, Chapter II reviews the formulation of the three
world doctrine from a combination of theoretical and historical
points

of

view.

It

emphasizes

in particular

the

interactions

between Marxism, Maoism, the Chinese world view, and Sino-soviet
relations and examines the impact of such interactions on the
Chinese

policy making

process.

The

study

then

proceeds,

in

Chapters III, IV, and V, to trace the modification and adjustments
of

the three world doctrine in

nations or regions,
Europe,

Japan,

its

application to

individual

such as the developing countries,

and the United States,

Western

in 1 ight of the world's

changing political climate. In conclusion, the thesis suggests that
China's foreign policy, as exemplified by the three world doctrine,
consists
practice.

of

several

dimensions

and

operates

dialectically

in

While the third world has always occupied the most

prominent place in China's policy pronouncements, the first world--the United States and the Soviet Union ---is the true focus of
China's policy makers. No momentous· breakthrough is claimed as a
consequence of this study regarding the measurement how much each
of those variables contributes to China's foreign policy outcomes,
but

I

believe that

it has

established some

fresh

explanatory

linkages among them.
The completion of this study is

indebted to the help and

support of many individuals at various stages of its origin and
writing. The Carver Fund gave me early financial support that made
my academic endeavour at the University of Richmond possible. The
vi

encouragement of my parents in China sustained my high spirit
throughout the whole course of my two years of studies away from
home. Above all, my gratitude gbes to Dr. John

w.

Outland and Dr.

Sheila Caparico whose advice and supervision gave the thesis its
present form.

Xu Guojun
University of Richmond, Virginia
March 2, 1992
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Introduction

The theory of three worlds, which differentiates the three
forces in international politics, was officially inaugurated by
Deng Xiaoping in 1974 at the Sixth Special Session of the United
Nations General Assembly. Deng Xiaoping declared that in the
international arena the United States and the Soviet Union---the
two superpowers---constituted the first world, the underdeveloped
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America formed the third
world, and the other developed countries apart from the two
superpowers made up the second world. Deng also pledged that
China belonged to the third world and would always stand by its
side in its struggle against imperialism and to establish a more
just world order. 1
Since the birth of the PRC in 1949, the Communist regime has
carried out a perplexing series of foreign policies: it has
supported anti-West national liberation movements; it has
supported insurgent guerrillas in some countries trying to
overthrow their governments; but it has also courted the
"militarist" Japan and the "imperialist" Great Britain and even
cooperated with the "hegemonist" United States.

1

see Peking Review April 19, 1974. pp.6-11.

How and to what

extent in fact, then, have China's foreign policy and her global
strategy been dictated by the three world theory?

To what extent

has China led or followed, helped or hindered the elusive
struggle of the third world?

What, indeed, does China intend to

achieve by dividing the world into three parts? Is there any
discernable pattern in China's relations with the rest of the
world? And finally, what are the sources that made up this
peculiar foreign policy? These are some of the most important
questions which require more attention now that China, whether it
is with the first world, the second world, or still the third
world, has become an active and influential member of the world
community.

2

Chapter I: The Methodology Of Studying
Chinese

Foreign Policy

It is no simple matter to sort out the variables from the
constants in the patterns of behaviour characterizing China's
approach respectively to the three worlds. The difficulty lies in
how to differentiate between Beijing's public pronouncements and
short term tactics on the one hand, and, on the other, the
underlying motivations, perceptions, assumptions, goals, and
long-range strategies that have together shaped China's foreign
policy patterns. So far, as can be seen in the various contending
and conflicting explanations offered by scholars and diplomats,
the endeavour has not been very successful. One view, for
instance,. declares that China's foreign policy has roughly
followed the guideline of the three world theory---either by
appearance or nature China is a third world country seeking
changes in the existing world structure. Another view argues that
there is no coherence at all in China's diplomatic practice and
her much publicized theory. Still a third view contends that
China's foreign behaviour differs little from those of other big
powers. Of even more interest, many researchers and analysts have
not infrequently found themselves in contradiction with their own
previous conclusions as time moves on.

Without doubt, the failure to achieve a consistent
explanation is, to some

extent, due to the complex nature of

China's foreign policy---its fluidity, flexibility and
multidimensionality---but it is also certain that the failure is
attributable to some methodological shortcomings in scholastic
inquiry.

At the risk of oversimplification, the current research

of China's foreign policy could be summarized into four lines of
inquiry. The most common line approaches the issue through
analysis of ideological factors such as government statements and
official pronouncements. The second approach concentrates on
rational analysis that looks into China's national interests and
builds everything around them. A third line focuses on China's
bilateral relations with individual countries, such as Japan, and
tries to find a pattern in such relations. Concerns with the
impact of the international environment on China's foreign policy
constitute a fourth area which is sometimes called "systemic
analysis."

Needless to say, each of these four lines of inquiry

has contributed to the discovery of the truth in its own way. But
since all of them start from a particular standpoint, their
analyses are often misleading or one-sided at best.

The Ideological Approach
The most popular mode of inquiry is the ideological
approach. 1

Writing in China's Future, Allen

s. Whiting argues

Representatives of this school are found in Allen s.
Whiting, A. Doak Barnett and R. G. Boyd who argue that ideology
is at the base of perception and thus decision-making.
1

4

that China's foreign policy has been motivated by an ideology
that finds expression in the Leninist exertion of power to
destroy capitalism by violence. Although other factors also bear
upon China's policy-making process, Whiting declares, "the
communist ideology is the basic reference point from which the
Chinese understand world affairs, set policy goals, and define
the legitimate means of pursuing these goals". Consequently, any
effective efforts to probe the nature of China's foreign policy
cannot but start with the role of the ideology. 2
In so far as ideology means the ideas at the basis of some
economic or political theory or system, 3 in so far as China has
become in many ways a symbol of the postwar ideological challange
to the established order in world politics, and in so far as
Marxism-Leninism is part of the total array of theories and
operational principles of China's foreign policy, the inquiry is
relevant. Relevant, too, is the unique role of ideology in the
politics of China. According to F. Schurmann, for instance,
ideology in communist countries plays a unique role which could
not be found in non-ideological societies. It "legitimizes
authority, integrates the community, rationalizes or justifies
policy decisions, and assists bureaucratic or elite-mass
communications and provides ligitimate foci for popular

See Allen s. Whiting China's Future McGraw-Hall Book
Company, NY:1977. p.38.
2

3

The Concise Oxford Dictionary London:l960. p. 589.
5

emotions." 4 During the forty years it has controlled the country,
the Chinese Communist Party has staged one campaign after another
aimed to "unify its people's mind" and to bring them in step with
its policy decisions. Its media---the People's Daily and the Red
Flag Magazine---has carried from day to day two constant themes:
the danger of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism. Political
indoctrination was also conducted through factory assemblies and
farm meetings. To a certain extent, the Chinese Communist Party
did succeed in planting in its people's consciousness a sense of
hatred against the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus,
whether from a normative point of view or practical point of
view, it is imperative to probe the role of ideology in China's
foreign policy making.

However, does this mean that China's

public statements, newspaper editorials and popular slogans tell
everything about China's policy making process? In other words,
is the ideological component an adequate enough means for policy
analysis?
Much evidence suggests that reliance on ideological analysis
alone would not necessarily lead to discovery of Peking's foreign
policy goals. Instead, it could sometimes end up in mere
speculation. One could ask, for instance, if Mao Tsetung was so
possessed by the Leninist idea of world revolution, why did he
choose to limit his role to that of "communicating experiences"
with his third world allies, rather than directly exporting

4

F. Schurmann Ideology and Organization in Communist China
Berkeley:1970. pp.58-73.
6

revolutions to them?

If Mao Tsetung was so preoccupied with the

Marxist goal of destroying capitalist countries, how could China
trade with Britain, France and Japan more than with Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria? or one could make the following
observation: both Mao Tsetung and FDR called upon their countries
to become "arsenals"--- one the "arsenal of revolution," the
other "the arsenal of democracy. 115

Disregarding their moral

implications, is there any difference, in terms of policy
instruments, between the two ideological calls?

Looked at from

these perspectives, the ideology model is not able to solve the
basic analytical problems, such as: how is it possible to
distinguish meaningfully between a foreign policy that is
ideological and one that is not? In ideology-oriented policies,
how and how much ideology is translated into policies? And how is
it possible to determine "the ideological content of an action
which benefited the state performing it in some conventional way,
such as by improving its power, prestige or security? 116

5

Mao Tsetung said that "We China ... are not only the
political centre of world revolution, but moreover in military
matter and technology must also become the centre of world
revolution ... we must become the arsenal of world revolution" in
1967 at the height of China's "Cultural Revolution. FDR made his
call---the call upon America to become the arsenal of democracy--during the Second World War when the whole world faced the
threat of Hitler. I see that ideological propaganda and
instigation are policy tools that both ideological and
nonideological coutries would use at certain time. see also Allen
Whiting China's Future p.42.
6

see J.D. Armstrong. Revolutionary Diplomacy University of
California:l977. p.6.
7

After all, what is ideology?

In one sense, ideologies are

"sets of values and beliefs. 117 They are presumed to have
universal validity and to be applicable to all circumstances.
Thus, they are necessarily stated in general, broad, abstract
forms, and, like law, they have to be interpreted and their fit
tested in every specific case.

In another sense, ideology is a

consciousness which is characterized by fluidity and change. It
changes in form and content in accordance with time and
conditions. A "false consciousness 118 , in particular, could be
mere pretense, propoganda or simply a disguise that conceals
reality for political uses. As Marxists, the Chinese Communists
are not blind followers to Marxist dogmas. Instead, they have
displayed considerable flexibility in applying Marxism to their
activies in China. In his writings, Mao Tsetung time and again
admonished his cadres of the danger of blind adherence to theory
in defiance of reality in studying Marxism and Leninism. On one
occasion, he even went so far as to warn them "We should not be
misled by our own propaganda." 9 It is clear, then, that while
there could be no doubt about the Marxist nature of the Chinese
regime, it is equally true that Marxism has been very much
localized and nationalized in China during its forty years of

7see

Werner Levi's article "Ideology, Interests and Foreign
Policy" In International Studies Quarterly Vol.14, No. 1, March
1970.p.4.
8

see Hans J. Morganthau Politics Among Nations NY:1966.
pp.83-6.
9

Allen s. Whiting China's Future p. 43.
8

practice. The effectiveness of the ideological approach to
understanding China's foreign policy is, therefore, largely
dependent upon the extent to which Marxism-Leninism has been
translated into or manipulated in the policy process.

The "National Interest" Approach
The second popular approach adopts "rationality" as its basis
of analysis. "No modern statesman has ever claimed that he
committed his nation simply to prove its trustworthness or ever
led his nation to fight against an ideology quo ideology. Even
the Holy Alliance, intended by czar Alexander to enforce
Christian values in the governement of Europe was a piece of
sublime mysticism and nonsense," as Werner Levi pointed out in
his article "Ideology, Interests and Foreign Policy" published in
the March 1970 issue of International Studies Quarterly. 10 This
school thus emphasizes that China's foreign policy should and
could be explained only in terms of "national interests"---her
desire for security, political and economic benefits. While the
Marxist ideology is discarded as

disguising the regime's true,

interest-motivated objectives or as performing a rationalizing
function by presenting its self-interested behaviour in terms of
noble ideas, "national interest" is thought to signify "realism"

10

Werner Levi "Ideology, interests and Foreign Policy" in
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 14, No.1, March 1970, p.6;
see also Hans J. Morganthau In defense of National Interest NY:
1951.
9

and "pragmatism" on the part of the foreign policy
administrators. 11 The Chinese peace offensive at the 1956 Bandung
conference and the 1958 offshore island crisis, for instance, are
interpreted as being motivated by Beijing's need to develop its
internal economy. And the different stages of China's foreign
policy are said to result from a rational analysis of China's
needs and her capabilities. True, "national interests" as policy
goals are more observable than ideology and can be deduced from
policy outputs. But like ideology, the concept of "national
interest" is also ambiguous: it could refer to the particular
interests of one nation state against another; it could also
denote the interest of group within a community. If the
international peace environment Zhou Enlai was promoting at
Bandang would help China's first Five-year Plan at home,
"national interest" could be a good explanation for China's "five
principles" diplomacy. If the international crisis of 1958 could
prod the various political factions at home to unite behind a
domestic development program, "national interest" could also be a
fine explanation for the linkage between the 1958 Taiwan Strait
crisis and Mao's commune program.

If, however, the Bandung peace

policy and the Taiwan Strait crisis policy are juxtaposed in the
light of "national interests", the explanations simply create a
case of contradiction. The recent fact that massive cooperation
with the United States and other western countries was possible
only with the simultaneous emergence of Deng Xiaoping and the
11

Hans J. Morganthau Politics Among Nations NY:l966. p.5.
10

disappearance of the Gang of Four is another indication that
"national interests" is an invariably subjective concept and it
alone is incapable of explaining China's foreign behaviour.
Moreover,

from an historical perspective, the Chinese concept of

"national interests" has changed dramatically from one period to
another. How to evaluate realistically China's foreign policy
goals, therefore, requires a wider apporach than trying to
determine the concept of "Chinese national interests."

The Dyadic Approach

A third favoured mode of studies is to look into China's
dyadic relations. If neither ideology nor "national interest" is
objective and substantive enough to reach the general truth
behind China's policy-making, then the best way is to examine
case by case China's attitude toward individual countries. As an
intermediate step leading tword a general consideration of the
totality of China's foreign policy, studies of her bilateral
relations certainly have value. They can lead to abundant
empirical findings and perhaps yield low-level generalization for
theory building. The examination of China's relations with Japan,
for instance, will give us insight into China's attitude toward
a neighbouring capitalist country which is economically powerful
and strategically important. However, studies that stop at the
dyadic level can never, from the methodological point of view, go

11

beyond the level of ad hoc explanations, nor can they add much
theoretical value to the study of Chinese foreign policy. 12
The case of Sino-Japanese relations does not point to the
rationale behind Sino-British relations or Sino-French relations,
let alone illuminate how the relationship with one country could
affect the relationship with another. There are simply too many
differences between each case to produce deductive power through
this approach.

The Reactive Approach
A fourth approach is to adopt a reactive view of China's
conduct of foreign relations in both geographical and functional
areas. 13 "Whatever the power of ideology, whatever the personal
influence of Mao Tsetung, and whatever the desirability of each
objective, the Chinese Communist Party could not transcend the
time and environment in which it was placed. Its decisions of
policy toward the United States, the Soviet Union and the third
world were determined ... by the international political
configuration of the time and China's geopolitical position.nu
12

Hsiung and Kim China In the Global Community Praeger:

1980. p.3.
13

One theory is Richardson's reaction process which argues
that nations, like individuals, usually behave toward others as
others behave toward them. Another theory is that of the
environmentalists such as Harold Sprout and Halford Mankinder
that sees factors such as geography, demography, resource
distribution .•. as determining the foreign approach of a country.
Although the two theories are different in their emphasis, they
share the common characteristic of environmental determinism.
u

Hsiting and Kim. ibid. p.8.
12

rt is, therefore, essential to have a systemic view of
international relations when we come to study China's foreign
policies. Like other countries on the world stage, China must
respond to changes in her external environment; she must
constantly adjust her policy postures toward any given country in
light of its posture changes, leadership shifts, socio-economicopolitical developments and other occurances in the international
system. In the early 1950s, for instance, China leaned toward the
Soviet Union when she was threatened by the United states. She
leaned back to the us in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the
soviet Union became the bigger threat and the us changed its
hostile attitude. A comparison of China's foreign aid with that
of the Soviet Union, for another example, yields insight into
China's regional priorities and the impact of Sino-Soviet
competition on China's policies toward specific third world
countries. China's aid pattern seems to move along with
opportunities arising out of circumstances where Soviet influence
was absent, as in East Africa, or had gone sour, as in Sudan and
Egypt.IS

However, as with previous approaches, any attempts to

focus solely on circumstances will risk the same danger of
''seeing the tree and missing the wood."

For one thing is

certain, foreign policy making, like a drama whose plot develops
with the interaction between roles, is not a passive process.
Rather, it involves the wills and initiatives of the policy-

IS Other cases include the establishment of diplomatic
relations with Rwanda, Brundi, Cameroon, Togo, Tunisia and Zaire.
13

maker. When certain external factors come to bear, a foreign
policy maker does not respond in the rebounding manner a spring
does, but through perception of the event---its positive as well
as negative implications. One could choose to act, or not act, in
whatever manner one deems most appropriate to his or her
interests. Otherwise how could we explain the triangle
relationship between the United States, China and the Soviet
Union? Or how could we explain China's competitive aid programs
to Ethiopia and Somalia . 16

The contextual Approach
In short, all of the methods discussed above carry with them
a one-sided bias or an ad hoc suspicion. The fault with them, as

c.

James

Hsiung has pointed out, is that no single variable

stands above the decision-making process, and all are subject to
redefinition in response to changing times. A focus on any single
one of them will yield little or no understanding of Peking's
actual policy behaviour or outcome.

What is needed, therefore,

is to develop a systematic framework which could remedy ad hoc
with coherence. In other words,

we need to adopt a contextual

16

Both Somalia and Ethiopia rank high on the Chinese and
Soviet grantee list. The fact that China entered those countries
later than the Soviet Union and offered them more generous aid
programs indicates China's intention to balance off Soviet
influence there. see John A. Cringen and Steve Chan Chinese
Crisis Perception and Behaviour: A Summary of Findings Paper
delivered at the JCCC Workshop On Chinese foreign Policy.Ann
Arbor, Mich. Autust 12-14, 1976.
14

approach which would cross-check and weigh all possible variables
of a foreign policy in a related manner.
A contextual approach to Chinese foreign policy analysis
should at least consider three possibilities. First, it should
seek to establish a foreign-domestic, historical-present
linkage. 17 This is not merely to juxtapose descriptions of
important domestic and foreign events, or descriptions of past
history and present events. This can at best help explain
particular connections between specific sets of domestic and
foreign data at certain times and produce some low level
generalizations. Instead, a contextual approach should seek to
establish some coherent explanatory relationships on such levels
as the machinery of foreign policy making within China's
political system, the (practical] effects of external
stimuli/demands, [the psychological effects of sentiments
accumulated from past experiences] and China's foreign policy
outputs. All of this would be very much along the lines that
James N. Rosenau has developed. 18 For instance, China's
cooperative posture toward the United states should be linked to
the fall of the leftist faction within the Chinese leadership, to
the need of the Four Modernization Drive, to the aspiration to
revive her power status, to her historical sentiment toward
Tsarist Russia, and to the reassessment of the international

17

see James N. Rosenau ed. Linkage Politics NY: Free press.

1969
18

James

Rosenau. Linkage Politics 1969.
15

situation. A complete understanding of China's shift in foreign
policy in 1978 could not be reached without addressing all those
variables.
Second, the contextual approach needs further to sort out the
relative weight of those variables often involved in foreign
policies, some of which may actually be competing for the
attention of the decision makers. These factors include
ideological preferences, national interests, historical
experiences, political culture, domestic structure and political
attributes, systemic factors, conditions in the international
system, real and perceived capabilities and so on. They occupy
different positions in the policy making process at different
times. In the 1950s, for instance, national security towered
above all other concerns, while in the 1980s economic demands
downplayed the interests of ideological promotion. One must also
ask, how does the relative weight of each factor change?
Precisely because these concepts are subject to constant
redefinition, it is essential to examine these diverse sources of
foreign policy in order to understand properly what the policy
goals are in a given case.
Finally, the contextual approach needs to look into the
complexity of different levels and types of China's external
relations, that is official and unofficial, bilateral and
multilateral, political and economic, substantive and symbolic
and so on. Different from most other countries, whose foreign
policies almost exclusively deal with state relations, China's
16

foreign policy gropes along several dimensions at the same time.
In China, international relations are regarded as a situation in
which social, economic and political forces---some identified
with particular national states and others cutting across
national lines---are contending for supremacy. International
relations are, thus, not only, or in many situations not even
primarily, a matter of conventional dealings between nation and
nation, or government and government. Official government policy
and government-to-government relations are, it is true, important
aspects of China's foreign policy, but the Chinese approach to
foreign policy demands the use of every possible instrument,
formal and informal, overt and covert, to influence and shape the
changing pattern of social, economic and political development
outside China's borders. A noticable example is China's treatment
of its relations with the Burmese government in the early 1960s.
When Burma's prime minister, Ne Win, visited China in 1963 and
was given a ceremonious reception in Peking, the Burmese
communist party was praised for its armed struggles against its
government in Ragoon. The Chinese explained this dichotomy as a
function of the difference between state-to-state and party-toparty relations. 19

Therefore, it is important to watch those

linkage questions: how are "unofficial relations used to promote
or deter official relations? How do multilateral relations affect
China's bilateral relations, or vice versa? When do public

19

A. Doak Barnett Communist China and Asia London: Oxford
University Press. 1960. p.71.
17

pronouncements remain propaganda and when do symbolic relations
become substantive? Failure to distinguish them will result in
omitting an important aspect of China's foreign policy behaviour.
This list is not conclusive, and perhaps may never be
conclusive. Since Chinese foreign policy is exceedingly complex
and flexible, we have to take an extra step in order to find
approximate truth.

18

Chapter II

The origins Of The Three world Doctrine

It has by now become clear that the main intention of the
three world doctrine was to counterbalance the influence of the
United states and the soviet Union by rallying the support of the
underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America as
well as promoting the neutrality of the developed countries in
Europe and Japan. If, however, one is to further assess the
validity of this strategy, one needs, first of all, to examine
the context from which it was derived. Although the three world
doctrine was officially inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping in 1974, it
was developed by Mao Tzetung much earlier, 1 and its political and
philosophical roots are to be found in several places, including
Mao Tsetung's revolutionary ideology, his nationalistic world
view, the characteristics of the international environment, and
the conditions of China's military, economic and diplomatic
development. This chapter will study the impact of such facftors
as the changing Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese world view,
Maoism, and the current international situation on the
formulation of China's foreign policy.

1

The term "three worlds" was first used by Mao Tsetung in a
conversation between him and an African leader in 1972. The
evolution of the theory may even traced to Mao's talk with the
American correspondent Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. see Mao
Tsetung Selected Works 1969, Vol.4. pp.97-101.

The Impact of the Sino-soviet Split
Numerous factors motivated China to formulate the three world
doctrine, but what appears to be the immediate cause is the
collapse of the Sino-soviet alliance. During the 1950s, the
Chinese accepted the Soviet view that the world is divided into
two hostile and irreconcilable camps---the socialist camp and the
capitalist camp, and followed a foreign policy of "leaning to one
side." Through the period of ten years the two sides had close
cooperation on an extensive range of issues and signed a series
of agreements on mutual assistance, credit, railway cooperation
and port leases. According to a Soviet statistics,
more than 10,000 Soviet experts and specialists were sent to
China to help industrial construction, while about 1000
Chinese scientists, 10,000 engineers, technicians and
skilled workers received training in the USSR. While more
than 11,000 Chinese students were trained at Soviet higher
educational institutions, the Soviet Union turned over to
China more than 24,000 sets of scientific and technical
documents, including 1,400 projects of large industrial
enterprises. 2
The effect of this cooperation was so obvious that the relation
between the two countries was celebrated by leaders both in
Peking and Moscow as "a great alliace between two socialist
countries" and "a powerful guarantee of China's independence and
security. 113

By the end of the 1950s, however, the friendship

began to go sour for apparently ideological reasons. Khruschov's
2

the report of Mikhail Suslov, secretary of the CPSU, to
the Soviet Congress 14 Feb 1964. cited in John Gittings Survey of
the Sino-Soviet Dispute Oxford:1968.pp.28-36.
3

Wu Yu-chang "Sino-Soviet Friendship and Unity Among the
Socialist countries" People's China No.2, 16 January 1957. pp.45.
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denunciation of Stalin and his call for co-existance with
capitalism at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 was
considered by the Chinese as "sheer betrayal of Marxism". 4 Then
in 1959, the Soviet government stopped all its aid programs to
China and called back all its technicians and adivsors currently
working on Chinese projects. Finally, in 1964, both the Soviets
and Chinese began to deploy massive military forces along their
borders.
Some people have wondered why, since both the Chinese and the
soviets shared the same ideological objective, they could have
turned against each other in the pursuit of that ideological
objective. Others have suggested that as disputes developed in
the course of cooperation, they were contradictions of a
cooperative nature. Indeed, nothing could be further from the
truth than to suggest that China could have been kept in the camp
by its ideological orientation or that the final split could have
been avoided if both sides could have compromised with each other
a little. For one thing, the two-camp doctrine is theoretically
characterized by inherent dilemmas. As defined by many theorists
and practitioners of international relations, international
politics is a process of determining the position of each country

4

see the Editorial in The People's Daily July 14, 1964 "On
Khruschov's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the
World". see also A. Doak Barnett China after Mao Princeton
Press:l967. p.123.
21

in the structure of international political economy. 5

From a

more pessimistic point of view, in particular, political power in
the international system is so distributed that the gaining by
one country necessarily means the losing by another. The two-camp
doctrine which requires the subordination of one nation to the
other is, therefore, inherently incapable of answering the
fundamental questions posed to politicians regarding the
independent role of each nation in international affairs. The
policy dilemmas will only stand out when placed in the context of
big power relations. According to Professor Chun-tu Hseuh's
research, what actually determined the course of development
behind the ideological disputes were two issues, both of which
surmount China's security and independence. One of them was the
different views of strategy against the United States who was
then China's major threat. The policy of co-existance with
capitalism would mean, in the Chinese perspective, no less than
open indulgence of US hostility toward China.

The other issue

was "the five unreasonable demands" put on China by the Soviet
government. According to Professor Hsueh's interpretation of Geng
Biao, China's vice premier and defence minister, who commented on
the issue at the Chinese Embassy in Washington in 1979, the five
demands included the permanent stationing of Soviet forces in
Port Arthur, the establishment of a joint fleet under Soviet
5

Ferguson and Mansbach explain that one of the premises of
political realism is that competitive power politics, realist
style, is the alpha and omega of international relations. see
Ferguson and Mansbach.The Illusive Quest University of South
Carolina:l988. p.89.
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command, the establishment of a Soviet influence in the
development of resources in the Northeast and Northwest provinces
of China, the establishment of a long-wave radio station in China
for naval communication under soviet control, and the institution
of a division of labour between the two socialist countries--China would be responsible for agricultural production and the
soviet Union for industrial development and supplies. It is clear
to any person of reasonable judgement that these demands, if
accepted, would effectively deprive China of her sovereignty.
Under these circumstances, as Huan Xian said, the Chinese
government could not but come to the conclusion that the SinoSoviet Alliance had, in effect, become "a dead lane" for China.
For her independence, she had but to pursue "a third road. 116

The Impact of the Chinese World View
From a sociological point of view, the external policy of a
nation is always shaped by her image of herself. A glimpse into
China's history and China's national sentiment would exclude any
imagination that China would follow the two-camp doctrine in a
truthful manner.

In The Logic of International Relations, Steven

Rosen and Walter Jones have suggested that
The world outlook of communist China since 1949 has been
deeply influenced by history. Unlike the Soviet Union
or the United states, China has been seared by exploitation,
humiliation and oppression. The seemingly endless waves of
foreign conquerors passed through China within the memory of
the current generation of leaders. The difference between
6

See Huan Xian "China's Foreign Policy" in Peking Review
April 11, 1974. p.32.
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the sturdily independent and self-sufficient China before
is obvious even to its enemies. Without exaggeration, the
overriding consideration of Chinese foreign and domestic
policy has been the restoration and preservation of China as
a powerful and independent nation invulnerable to external
conquest and domination." 7
It is completely understandable how strongly China felt about
her past and future. While classical China

was a vast empire,

self-proclaimed as "the centre of civilization", throughout the
19th and a good part of the 20th century she suffered a great
deal of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. She was
forced by the threat of foreign military power to accede to a
series of "unequal treaties", in which she agreed to indemnify
large amount of money and to open almost all of her important
ports. The Treaties of Nanjing, Tianjing and Beijing, in
particular, by which China lost her control over trade tariffs
and vast territories including Hong Kong, Kowloon and the Amur
and Ussuri Rivers basins, 8 almost deprived China of all her
sovereignty.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of China's first

republic, described his feeling,
we are the poorest and weakest country in the world,
occupying the lowest position in world affairs; people of
other countries are the carving knife and the serving dish
while we are the fish and meat. 9

7

Steven J. Rosen and Walter Jones, The Logic of
International Relations Winthrop Publishers: 1986. p. 122.
8

The territory China lost to the Tsarist Russia alone was
about three times as large as France. cited in The History of
China.commercial press:1985.pp.79-83.
9

Sun Yat-sen San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the
people Shanghai Commercial Press:1928. p.12.
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The resulting sentiment among the Chinese people was
necessarily a strong sense of bitterness and a strong desire for
change. To paraphrase John K. Fairbank, in those years no Chinese
could be Chinese without having a dedicated conviction of the
innate worth and superiority of Chinese culture, and no Chinese
could be a patriotic Chinese without a dedicated commitment to
driving foreign presence out. 10

Suffice it to say here, as an

inheritor of this national mentality, the Chinese Communists
would pursue a foreign policy that was revisionist in nature.
While it would not take violent actions to seek changes in the
international structure, it would also not be willing to
subordinate itself to the will of any other nation, no matter
what kind of regime that nation was.

The Impact of Maoism
The Chinese communists are heir not only to a civilization
with a great imperial past, but also to modern revolutionary
ideologies. The Chinese foreign policy formula includes the
following basic principles which together constitute Mao
Tsetung's Thought:
1. the idea of a two-stage revolution in colonial and
semi-colonial countries, leading from a bourgeoisiedemocratic stage to a socialist stage;
2. the concept of a broad united international front to
include all positive forces;
3. the strategy of unity and struggle within the united
front toward the middle or neutral elements;
4. the need for a strong military force as backsupport;
10

John K. Fairbank The Chinese World Order Harvard: 1968.
pp.89-95.
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and 5. the need for flexibility and compromise in the
process of struggle.
From an analytical view, this formula is a misture of Marxist
dialectism and Chinese materialism, of Marxist revolutionary
romanticism and Chinese traditional pragmatism.
The ultimate question along this line of thinking, therefore,
whittles to that of Mao Tsetung's philosophy, his way of looking
at social development.
Central to Mao Tsetung's philosophy is his epistemology that
contradictions are inherent in every object and that it is the
prevailing of one aspect of the contradiction over the other that
makes social development. Revealingly, of all Mao's theoretical
works, "On Contradiction" and "On the Correct Handling of
Contradictions among the People" are designated by the CCP as the
handbooks that all of its cadre must read. Categorically, Mao's
vision focuses on two points. One is that he sees the historical
process in terms of a conflict between the two major opposing
forces. He emphasizes that
In the relationship between the various contradictions,
one and only one is supposed to be the principal
contradiction that ncecssarily determines the
development of others. All others are secondary and can
be easily solved as they are subordinated to the
resolution of the principal contradiction. 11
At the same time, Mao Tsetung recognizes that the resolving
of secondary contradictions is helpful to the resolution of
principal contradictions. He emphasizes that principal
contradictions, after all, exist on the background of secondary
11

Hsiung and Kim China in the Global Community. p.21.
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contradictions. When background disppears, the major drama will
not last long. Therefore, as an alternative, one could also
approach an issue by resolving easier and minor contradictions.
The third Maoist emphasis is that in methdology
contradictions should be seen as the substance of social life,
dialectics as the analytical method of understanding
contradictions, and struggle as the necessary process of
resolving contradictions. contradictions are prevalent in all
things. They rise, resolve, and rise again in a seemingly
endless, wavelike motion. From a purely philosophical point, this
epistemology is the most fundamental. Otherwise, how could one
understand that the imperialist Europe and the militarist Japan
should be categorized differently from the United States. The
teaching of this epistemology, as far as foreign policy is
concerned, will not be mistaken: in the process of struggle,
one's focus should shift from time to time, from place to place
and from actor to actor. While the target should be certain in
each phase of struggle, conflict, competition, coexistence and
cooperation are all permissible forms of action, as long as the
archemeny will be weakened.

The Impact of the International Environment
While theoretical dilemmas and national sentiments undercut
the validity of the two-camp policy, neither can Peking's
approach to world affairs be understood solely in terms of its
own aims and motivations. Communist China does not operate in a
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vaccum. Its policy, like that of other nations, is shaped to a
considerable degree by a process of action and interaction
between itself and other major powers, and between its leaders'
ambitions and the stubborn realities of the outside world.
The Chinese attitudes toward and relationship with the two
strongest powers are fundamental factors shaping China's
policies. Since achieving power in China, the Communists have had
to adapt their policy continuously to the requirements and
limitations imposed by the changing attitude of the United States
and the soviet Union. The basic power struggle between the big
two had determined China's every major maneuver on the world
scene. China and the soviet Union are geopolitically placed in
competitive positions. 12 Both are provided by nature with great
power potential, such as size and population, and are also placed
in proximate geographical locations. While China is the largest
and historically most influential country in Asia, the Soviet
Union, being a Eurasian country, also has a stake in the region.
Moreover, the Soviet Union is a largely landlocked country which
has no easy access to the Pacific Ocean without going

through

the Sea of Japan or the Sea of China. Consequently, the
relationship between the two countries has always been

tl Geopoliticians such as Harold Sprout, Halford Mankinder,
and Alfred Mahan point out that the foreign policies of a nation
are more determined by its geographical characteristics. See
Patrick M. Morgan Theories and Approaches to International
Politics Brunswick:NJ, 1987. pp.58-67.
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characterized by suspicion. 13 This is, of course, not to suggest
geographical determinism, but one need simply remember how France
and Germany had fought over Alsace-Lorraine and the Sarr.
Consequently, the ideological assumptions behind the two-camp
doctrine were constantly violated, despite the ideological
convergence between the two states.

Two of Mao's and Stalin's

secret speeches are revealing,
Mao: In 1950 I argued with Stalin in Moscow for two months.
We argued about the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and
Alliance, about the joint stock companies, about the border
questions.u
Stalin: We invited the Chinese comrades to come to
Moscow ..• The Chinese comrades agreed here with the views of
the Soviet comrades, but went back to China and acted
otherwise.u
If the two parties could not have a single mind in the hayday
of the Cold War, could they maintain their relations from further
deterioration as world politics moved from bipolarism to
policentrism? Toward the turn of the 1950s, the divergence
between the two sides became so wide that they turned into open
rivals. While the ever-growing appetite of the Soviet Union, as
underlined by its intervention in Eastern Europe, demanded
further submission from its campfellows and meant to deprive them
of national sovereignty, the Chinese grew an ever-stronger desire
to pursue their own foreign policy interests and to play their

13

Notice in the previous section, one of the five demands
the Soviet union put on China was the use of Port Arthur.
14

cited in Mao Tsetung Long Live Mao Tsetung Thought 1967.
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Vladmir Dedijer Tito p.322 (New York:Arno press,1953)
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own role on the world stage with the gradual buildup of national
capability, and especially with the imminent acquisition of the
nuclear bomb.
What could be said about China's reasons for joining the
Soviet camp is, therefore, that they represented more of a
measure of expediency than an expression of ideological devotion,
more of an intermediate tactic than of a final goal. It should be
remembered clearly that when China came onto the world stage in
1949 she was confronted by a stark reality that directly
threatened her existence. She was militarily and diplomatically
besieged by the United States and her allies and after 30 years
of civil war, her economy was almost prostrate and needed urgent
outside support. In the words of Camelleri,
"If China decided immediately after Liberation to lean to
the Soviet side, it was largely because at the height of the
Cold War there was little possibility of a middle road;
if its alliance with the soviet Union was not to consolidate
its independence, its struggle for revolution was
. .•• 16
no th ing
Whatever her original intentions, the fact is
that by joining the soviet camp China protected her vulnerable
independence from US pressure with Soviet military deterrence,
helped revive her prostrate economy with Soviet credit, and
quickened her developing pace with Soviet technology.
Following the above line of explanation, a second question
naturally surfaces about the three world doctrine: what logic

16

see camerilleri Chinese Foreign Policy Seattle:l980.
pp.47-53. and Yahuda China's Role in World Affairs st. Martin's
Press:l978. p.43.
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does it follow that the world should be so divided?

Again, this

question has to be looked at from several angles. To some extent,
it represents a problem of tactics and organization. With the
collapse of the Sino-soviet alliance, China was militarily and
diplomatically besieged on all sides, not only by the United
states but by the Soviet Union as well. Indeed, China perceived
collaborations and collusions between the Soviet Union and the
United States to strangle her on the world stage. Given the great
gaps in national capabilities between the two sides and the stark
reality that the world was so polarized that one half of the
developed world was controlled by the United states and the other
by the Soviet Union, what should China do to break out of the
encirclement? How could China counter the pressures of the
superpowers.? Clearly the only way was to form a counter-alliance
by winning the support of all elements which were not hostile to
China, including the neutrality of the middle elements. In The
Art of War, Mr. Sun Zi, an ancient Chinese military expert,
discussed the strategy of survival and breakthrough by an army in
difficulty:
When the enemy is powerful, look for its internal
contradiction, divide it, and then concentrate all your
power to attack its weakest link. 17
This surely is the only way for China to fight her way out of
encirclement. But how to apply this strategy: how to look for the
enemy's internal contradiction? how to divide it? and what forces
17

see Sun Zi The Art of War. Sun Zi was one of Mao Tsetung's
favourite writers. It is said that Mao carried his books all
along with him even in the hardest days during the Long March.
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are you going to concentrate? These are Mao Tsetung's
contributions. For him, while Sun Zi's strategy pointed out the
way to survival, the very key was in organizational matters--- in
correctly distinguishing true enemies from true friends, and
temporary allies from eternal comrades. In "An Analysis of the
Classes in the Chinese Society", he wrote,
Who are our enemies? who are our friends? He who does not
know how to distinguish his enemies from his friends cannot
be a revolutionary, yet at the same time it is no easy task
to distinguish them. If the Chinese revolution ... has shown
such meager results, it is not the goal but the tactics
which have been wrong. The tactical error committed is
precisely the inability to rally one's true friends in order
to strike at one's enemy. 18
With the assistance of this strategy, Mao was able to survive
the hardest times in his career. In each of the wars against the
warlords(l925-1927), against the Nationalists (1927-1949) and
against the Japanese{l936-1945), he was able to defeat strong
enemies with his guerilla forces . 19
In international politics, Mao Tsetung perceived basically
the same dynamic. For him, as for many other realists in the
international arena, the rest of the world influences a country
in three ever-present ways: it threatens it; it trades with it

18

Mao Tsetung "Analysis of the Various Classes in the
Chinese Society"(1926) in Selected Works Vol.1,1969.
19

A notable example is Mao's treatment of the Xian Incident.
When Chiang Kaishi was arrested by his generals in the December
of 1936 in Xian, Mao Tsetung did not take the opportunity to
eliminate his rival. Instead he helped secure Chiang's release.
Subsequently he made Chiang declare war against Japan. His
calculation was that while Japan had become the greatest threat
to China and his program, his contradictions with Chiang could be
put off until after the defeat of the Japanese.
32

and thus helps it; or it lends its influence in support of it or
against it. 20

When friendship, support and influence could not

be obtained from one group, they surely can be won from another
group, and when there is not enough muscle in one's own body to
compete with one's rival, he surely has to rally the support of
others. The crucial task for China is, therefore, to sort out the
external environment in such terms as "friendly forces",
"intermediate forces" and "hostile forces" , and properly fit
them into a scheme to isolate

enemies, just as was done in

domestic politics. The three world doctrine performed exactly
this function. By differentiating the three worlds, Mao Tsetung
cleared away the key questions of who to rely upon, who to unite
with, and who to strike at. By differentiating the three worlds,
he also made the tactical scheme of how to oppose strong enemies
when one's capabilities are weak.

20

The systemic model in international relations theory
explains "why the actors do what they do" in terms of reaction to
the external environment." see the chapter entitled "A System, a
system, the kingdom is a system" in Theories and Approaches to
International Politics Patrick M. Morgan, 1987.
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Chapter I I I

China's Relations with The Third World

China's credentials with third world countries are clear.
Since 1949, she has enthusiastically encouraged their national
independence from Western suzerains; she has extended generous
assistance to their economic construction programs; she has
received their national leaders with the highest honors; and she
has also advocated their political and economic interests at
every international forum. In short, as Harris and Worden
observe, "on every appropriate occasion, whether greeting the
People's Congress, or addressing the United Nations General
Assembly, Beijing's leaders and spokesmen have unanimously
asserted that China is a member of the Third World. 111

The Implications of the Third World

What does China intend to achieve through identifying herself
with the third world? And how does the third world as a group fit
into the Three world doctrine? And how could China identify
herself with the third world?

1

The third world, of course, has not been so enthusiastic.
See Lillian Craig Harris and Robert L. Worden China and the Third
World Auburn House: Mass.,1986, p.1.

To answer these questions, one needs, first of all, to look
at what the third world is. The Third World is a collective name
ref erring to those economically poor and underdeveloped nations
which stand in contrast to the developed capitalist world. It
consists of over 125 nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America
and constitutes

over 70 per cent of the world's population.

Theese countries are rich in natural resources but are mostly
small in size, diverse in culture, and different in perception of
national interests. For a very long time in history they were
colonies of Western countries.
At the same time, the third world is the fastest changing
part of the world, both in political and economic capabilities.
Since World War II, third world countries have won freedom and
independence from colonial rule one after another, and now over
120 of them are members of the United Nations.

The third world

emerged as a powerful political force in international relations
in 1964 at the meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) when a bloc of Asian and Latin American
countries began to meet as a Caucus of 77 to achieve political
goals through voting solidarity. Since then it has functioned as
a decision-making bloc in the United Nations General Assembly.
Although the third world nations still split on some issues due
to their cultural and

national differences, on key issues,

especially those dealing with economic development, ending
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colonialization, sovereignty and human rights, 2 they have shown a
record of almost complete voting solidarity. As a result, they
can almost always raise a two-thirds majority vote in the General
Assembly, meaning that the United States, the Soviet Union and
Western Europe constantly find themselves on the losing side. 3
The implications of these characteristics on China's global
strategy and her policy toward the third world in particular is
clear. The growing capabilities of the third world could not
escape China's vision.

When looked at individually, these third

world countries are economically poor and politically weak,
especially when they are viewed in light of their percentage of
World GNP, but if they act in concert, they decisively broaden or
narrow the maneuvering room of other countries, including the
superpowers.

Their voting power in the United Nations Assembly

and their role in world energy crises 4 testify that this
assertion ·is not at all extravagant.

In any case, the third

world constitutes a viable force in world politics for China who
was then drowned in the midst of external hostility and
diplomatic isolation.

2

Other major issues on which they have often found
themselves in solidarity include the establishment of a new
international economic order and the establishment of cartel
arrangements to control supply and fix world prices for such
products as oil, copper, bauxite, sugar and coffee etc.
3

It should be pointed out that voting patterns in the
United Nation have shifted considerably the last couple of
years.---author.
4

A notable example is the role of rising oil prices in the
recession of the industrial countries in 1973.
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on the Chinese side, too, it was also a natural tendency that
she would identify herself with the world's underdogs. First, the
third world is the only force available in international politics
that could be really motivated to support China. In the post-war
era, the industrial world was completely polarized between the
two superpowers, the east dominated by the Soviet Union and the
west by the United States. The third world was, in comparison,
the only "free world" over which a third power other than the two
superpowers could exert influence. It was, therefore,
situationally determined that the "poor" and "weak" third world
should be taken by China as the mainstay of her united
international front.
Second, the third world has the political motivation to be
allied with China. In his report to the People's Congress on
China's foreign relations(1954), Chu Jung-fu, then vice foreign
minister, assessed the potential of the third world's support,
•.. colonial and semi-colonial states have either won
national independence or are engaged in the struggle for
national independence. Both the Chinese people and the
people of these countries have for a long time been
subjected to the oppression and exploitation of imperialism
and have suffered long enough ••• They share a common
interest in the wiping out of colonialism~ and there are no
basic conflicts of interest among them ...
Clearly, in the Chinese evaluation, the fact that the third world
countries were colonized by the West would make them natural
allies of China, and for the extent to which they had suffered at

5

chu Jung-fu "Foreign relations of new China during the past
five years', World Culture, 5 Oct. 1954, in current Background~
no. 307, 6 Dec. 1954. pp.1-9.
37

the hand of their suzerains, they would be most resolute in will
and most persistent in action

to resist the hegemony of the

superpowers. It was, therefore, politically possible to integrate
their aspiration for independence into China's counter-superpower
struggle.

China's Policy Goals

As with the development of the three world doctrine itself,
China's foreign policy toward the third world also went through
several stages of change and there is an apparent symmetry
between the two. The earliest interest of China in the third
world was mainly related to two factors: their common historical
experiences and China's ideological expectations. Both China and
the majority of the third world countries had suffered
colonization by the Western countries. Out of sympathy and
largely influenced by the spectacular success of her own, the
Chinese leadership genuinely wished that these countries would
soon win independence on the model of the Chinese revolution.
Secondly, driven by her ideological preferences, the Chinese
leadership expected that the third world countries would quickly
join the socialist camp and that their movements for national
liberation and independence would soon sweep across the rest of
Asia, Africa and Latin America. (It should be emphasized that
this expectation was not an integral part of China's own program.
It was mostly the result of sympathy and ideological
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preferences.) Thus, during the early 1950, China carried a
contradictory attitude toward the Third World. On the one hand,
she believed that the third world countries were a progressive
force in international politics, but on the other she felt
dissatisfied with them and even regarded them as reactionary for
their neutralism in a world of clear division.
However, by 1954 the Chinese rejection of the third world's
non-alignment began to change. Obviously, the change was a part
of the total adjustment of China's perception of the world system
and her place in world affairs. As has been discussed in the
previous chapter, the focus of China's foreign policy has always
been centred around concerns about her international position and
national security which are largely determined by her
relationship with the superpowers. With the dynamics of the twocamp politics running out in the mid-1950s, China began to
conceive an independent role in international relations. She
perceived in the neutral third world a potential political base
upon which she could establish herself and in non-alignment a
convenient tool to counterbalance the influence of the
superpowers.

Therefore, in contrast to her earlier attitude

toward the third world countries, the Chinese no longer regarded
their neutrality as conservative or reactionary, but rather that
the more neutral and the more independent they were, the better
for China.
The first step along this line was taken by Zhou Enlai,
China's premier and foreign minister, at Bandung in 1954. Instead
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of encouraging the Asian and African countries to join the
socialist camp, as China had always done, Zhou Enlai advocated
the Five Principles of Peaceful co-existence6 as the basis of
Chinese

foreign policy. The five principles include respect for

each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity; abstention
from aggression and threats against each other; non-interference
in the internal affairs of one another; recognition of equality
of all nations large and small; and mutual benefit in economic
and cultural relations. The significance of the raising of the
five principles,. as was demonstrated by China's subsequent policy
behaviour, could never be overestimated. It marked a shift in
China's general attitude toward the existing world order and the
perception of her future role in world affairs. First, it was an
open deviation from, if not yet total negation of, the two-camp
doctrine and the "leaning to one side" policy.

Second, it

refuted, in effect, the legitimacy of the Soviet leadership over
other countries and China in particular. And thirdly, it
manifested China's intention to establish her own sphere of
influence. In short, as Mao Tsetung's "Great Disorder Under
Heaven 117 indicates, by stressing equality, China was encouraging
6

The Five Principles were included in the joint agreement
signed between China and India in April 1954.
7

This is recalled from my memory of my school days when
every child in school learned Mao Tsetung's speeches, although I
can not remember whether it is a poem or a speech. But certain am
I about its gist: the current international situation is
characterized by disorder, the greater the disorder, the better
for revolution. Deng Xiao Ping's speech at the UN Assembly of
1974 also mentioned the great disorder under heaven wherein all
the political forces in the world go through drastic division and
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a policentric world order and a realignment of world forces.
Following the Bandung conference, China initiated a series of
diplomatic actions which were totally independent of Soviet
influence or camp concerns. She fostered cooperation with India
and Burma with whom she had border problems. She established
diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Nepal, Egypt, Syria, Yeman
and Ceylon, all of which had social systems vastly different from
her own. She even sought to improve relations with neighbouring
countries such as Pakistan and Iraq that had committed themselves
to various forms of military alignment

with the United States.

The net intention of these actions was to establish the basis for
a provisional alliance between the neutralist third world
countries and China, and, in addition, "to project the image of a
modern, rapidly developing, cooperative society deserving of
legal and political recognition as an important member of the
world community".

8

If this policy change manifested only China's intention to
break out of the diplomatic encirclement imposed by the United
States, its intention toward the Soviet Union was soon
demonstrated without ambiguity at the second Afro-Asian
conference. Like the first conference, this second one was a club
gathering convened to discuss national independence movements. In
keeping with China's usual attitude on the subject matter, the
conference should have made a place for the Soviet Union who was
realignment. see also Peking Review April 19,1974. p.11.
8

Camelleri. Ibid. pp.79.
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then still regarded by China as the leader of world revolution.
Nevertheless, China opposed Soviet participation on the ground
that she was not an Asian or African country. When resentment
grew among the third world countries not at odds with Moscow and
it appeared that China might not get her way, she threatened to
withdraw. In 1966, when the first Tricontinental Conference {The
First Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and
Latin America) was held in Pro-Moscow Havana, China made efforts
to convene a similar one in Beijing. Clearly, what China was most
concerned about was not ideological solidarity or the expansion
of the socialist camp, but rather the exclusion of competing
influences.

Looked at from these perspectives, China's third

world policy---its encouragement for national independence and
non-alignment---was nothing but the product of careful
calculation of national interests, despite the fact that she had
historically supported these countries out of sympathy and
proletarianism.

China's dominant value was to establish a pro-

China political constituency in the international community which
would help China break out of the diplomatic isolation drawn by
the superpowers.

The Instruments of Policy
Needless to say, the third world policy was carried out
within the parameters of realpolitik, both at the level of policy
pronouncement and execution. At the former level, China
highlighted everywhere the points of conflict between the third
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world and the superpowers and underscored the points of identity
between the third world and herself through condemning the
injustice of the existing

world order, calling for equal

sovereignty for all, and politicizing issues of international
concern related to the third world.

The definitions of the

"superpower" and the "third world", for instance, were given full
political significance, in contrast to the ordinary academic
sense that describes them in terms of their aggregate power
potentials and their levels of economic development. In his
speech at the above-mentioned UN General Assembly, Deng xiao Ping
defined that "a superpower is an imperialist country which
everywhere subjects other countries to its aggression, therefore
control, subversion or plunder and strives for world hegemony"
whereas a third world country is exactly the victim of the
superpower ambitions. 9

On the other hand, China described her

own position as one who shared the destiny of the third world and
was dedicated to the fight against imperialism and hegemonism.
China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be
one •.. If one day China should change her color and turn
into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the
world .•. the people should identify her as social
imperialism, expose it, opJ>ose it and work with the Chinese
people to overthrow it ...
A corollary to the characteristic of high politicization is
vagueness and lack of precision in using technical terms.

In the

majority of her policy pronouncements, it was never indicated

9

see Deng Xiaoping's speech Peking Review Ibid.

10

Deng's speech Peking review Ibid.
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where the edges of the term's meaning were. For instance, when
did China become a third world country? Do all of the socialist
countries belong to the third world? Do such countries as Cuba of
the 1960s and Vietnam of the late 1970s belong to the third
world? These questions were not clarified. on the contrary, terms
such as peace-loving nations and third world countries were often
used interchangably. The effect is that there is left a wide
margin of flexibility for determining the real meaning of China's
policy. These characteristics were not the result of mindless
mistakes, but of tactical deliberation. The value-laden
definition, in effect, served to draw a line between the first
world on the one side and the third world on the other. It also
helped the third world, with which China had pledged
identification, to align itself accordingly in international
affairs, without alienating vacillating elements or locking up
her own hands.
Thus, in practice we saw many faces of China in her relations
with the third world: leader as well as supporter, champion as
well as benefactor, all played out in reference to its objectives
and the circumstances of the time. During the whole 1960s and the
early part of the 1970s, China extended substantial aid on a
fairly sustained basis to over 70 third world countries and
supported them through political, economic and cultural grantprograms.

In the 7 years from 1968 to 1976 alone, the volume of
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foreign aid amounted to US$3000 millions. 11

As she was

militarily antagonized and diplomatically isolated during that
period, China made winning the support of the third world
countries the highest objective of her foreign policy. Among the
tactics she used was her conscious effort to portray herself as
different from other big countries. Thus, we find remarkable not
only China's aid volume compared with her own economic scale, but
also her aid pattern which was so different from those of the
Soviet and Western loans. Much of China's assistance consisted
chiefly of outright grants.

Even in cases of loans she allowed

very low rates of interest and very long periods for repayment.
She also excluded from her aid materials which were readily
available in recipient countries. These created differences
portrayed Chinese economic and technical aid as a concrete
manifestation of her true identity with the third world and as a
valuable element in the "common"task of national construction and
the "common" struggle against imperialism. Although such aid
arrangements made China's own economic construction additionally
constrained, the very fact of China's unwealthy economy made her
especially heroic and heart-touching. China was only too pleased
to derive the political advantage from the contrast painted
between her approach to economic aid and that of other big
powers. This helped China obtain not only maneuvering room in a
time of diplomatic isolation, but also broad political support in

11

Hsueh Chun-tu China's foreign Relations Praeger:1982,

p.42.
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the international community. In 1971, China was voted into the
United Nations in spite of the strong opposition of the United
states.
Once recognized in the international community, as symbolized
by her accession to the United Nations, China began to adopt the
posture of a champion of third world interests to increase her
influence in international affairs. International forums became a
convenient vehicle for her to realize this goal. By offering
moral support to favoured third world initiatives and rejoinders
to the developed world for its imperialist, colonialist, or
protectionist attitude toward developing countries, she presented
herself as a leader in the debate between the two sides.
According to Harris and Worden's finding, the importance of third
world development and the effects of the first and second world's
political, economic and military policies on development have
been the themes of every address China's representatives have
delivered at annual UN opening seesion since 1971. 12 A tangible
example is her call for the long-sought third world goal of a new
international economic order:
The third world countries strongly demand that the present
extremely unequal international economic relation be
changed, and they have made many rational proposals of
reforms. The Chinese government and people warmly endorse
and firmly support all just propositions made by the third
world countries. 13

12

Harr is and Worden. Ibid. p. 12 5.

13

Peking Review April 19,1974. p.10.
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All such initiatives tipped the balance of influence between
China and the superpowers so much that the latter constantly
found themselves in the minority at international forums.
The third world policy accrued China other benefits as well.
By paying special attention to its small Asian neighbours, the
policy contributed to enhancing China's security interest. It
could be easily recognized that of all the third world regions,
south and Southwest Asia received the bulk of China's foreign
policy attention for geopolitical reasons. Geographically
adjacent to the Southern border of China, the relation between
the countries in question and China are traditionally described
as "lips and teeth". Since the end of its empire age, China has
attempted to establish "good neighbour relations" with them. With
the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the strategic
importance of the region was more than ever buttressed.

The

United states had stationed troops to China's east and southeast
in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines etc., and the
Soviet Union had built up massive military forces on its northern
border. Now the Soviet Union was taking initiatives to expand its
influences in India

and meant, from China's perspective, to

encircle it from the south. China had certainly to take
corresponding actions in the region to thwart the perceived
Soviet intention. By extending generous aid and frequently
sending goodwill delegations, the third world policy paved
China's way into Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangaledash
and Indochina, countries which geopolitically "counter47

encircled" India. From 1968 to 1978, the above countries received
US$ 1000 millions in peace time aid, accounting for 39 percent of
the total foreign aid China committed during the period. 14
The third world policy portrayed an image of China as
"neither leader nor follower, yet both champion as well
supporter". The motive of this policy is obvious and the lesson
is also clear.

To thwart the intention of a powerful hostile

alliance, the best way is to strengthen one's own alliance by
whatever means. However, other questions still remain,
especially, if the above policy had been a function of a siege
mentality, the consciousness of being encircled by hostile and
hegemonic

predators. Can China maintain her policy now that the

environment has so dramatically changed? This question will be
discussed in the fifth chapter.

14

Hsueh Chun-tu China's Foreign Relations Praeger:l982,p.41
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Chapter IV: China's Relations With The second World

When the representative of China and his counterpart from the
European Economic Community signed the agreement on mutual
cooperation in 1975, the world witnessed one of the most dramatic
breakthroughs in modern diplomacy. China became the first
communist country (Yugoslavia excepted) to recognize the
organization of capitalist countries. The event thus signified a
tilt in China's foreign policy toward Western Europe. At the same
time the event also manifested a clear difference between China's
approach toward this part of the world and its approach toward
the third world. Rather than embracing wholeheartedly or
championing enthusiastically, as she did to the third world,
China looked at the second world with an eye half filled with
suspicion. The Chinese representative insisted on incorporating
into the agreement an "antihegemonism" clause. 1
How did China come to deal with the second world differently
than with the third world? Why should China court the second
world whom she did not trust? And how well did the second world
fit into the scheme of China's three worlds differentiation?
These same questions have to be asked if we are to understand the
overall pattern of China's foreign behaviour. This chapter will

1

The same clause was incorporated into the Treaty of Peace
and Friendship signed between China and Japan in 1978.

discuss the various dilemmas imposed on China's policy thrust by
the political ambivalence of the second world. It will also trace
the calculations the Chinese policy makers made in their dealings
with these countries.

The Implications of the Second world

The second world comprises the small and medium-sized
capitalist countries, namely western Europe and Japan. As a
group, these countries share such characteristics as being
economically well-developed and politically "vacillating" or
"conservative". While in the past they had been major colonial
powers that "exploited" and "oppressed" the people of the third
world, including the Chinese,, they were closely associated with
the United States---china's major antagonist---through political
and military alliances after the second World War. At the same
time, however, they were not identical with the United States,
but had contradictions with her. While they got nuclear
protection through alliance with the United States, they lost
much of their identity which was once so distinguished in
international affairs.
These characteristics put

Western Europe and Japan in a very

uncertain position in China's political spectrum: neither friend
nor enemy, yet both friend and enemy. Indeed, since coming to
power in 1949, the Chinese leadership had consistently attempted
to fit them into a well-defined theoretical framework, only to
find that there existed no clear answer to that question. In the
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1950s, for instance, when China adhered to the Soviet two-camp
concept of international relations, Western Europe was considered
to be a subordinate part of the American-dominated camp. The
intensity of the cold war denied the possibility of an
independent European foreign policy, as Mao Tsetung declared,
all people, without exception, must lean either to the
side of socialism, or to the side of capitalism.
Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third
road. 2
By the end of the 1950s when the relationship between China and
the Soviet Union began to decline, that rigid view became shaken.
Responding to both the internal dissension within Nato as well as
to the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict, Mao Tsetung began to take
a more flexible and dialectic view of the second world. Not only
did he start to notice the vacillating nature of second world
politics, but also began to emphasize its progressive side. In an
interview with a visiting French parliamentary delegation in
January 1964, Mao Tsetung is reported to have defined the
political role of Western Europe and Japan in the following
manner,
La France ••. , l'Allemagne, L'Italie, l'Angletterre a
condition qu'elle cesse d'etre courtier de l'Amerique,
le Japan et nous-meme---Voila le tiers monde. 3
How did Mao Tsetung's dialectics come to define the changing
role of the second world in that manner? The answer is simple
enough. First, with the threat of the United States and the

2
3

Mao Tsetung Selected Works vol.4, p.415.

L'Humanite (Paris) Feb 21, 1964, p.3
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soviet Union being perceived as the principal contradiction with
China, the contradictions with "certain other imperialist
powers", which were once salient and sharp, were reduced to a
secondary status. Second, the tactical necessity of
"concentrating all forces to deal with principal contradictions"
defies the ideas of struggling against many contradictions at one
time. Thus, the political positions of Western Europe and Japan
were anatomized as an intermediate zone floating and flirting
between the first world and the third world. They were to be
reappraised from time to time in accordance with the changes of
the international situation. According to Mao Tsetung, these
countries
oppress and exploit the oppressed nations and are at
the same time controlled and bullied by the
superpowers. They have a dual character and stand in
contradiction with both the first and third worlds. But
they are still a force the third world can win over or
unite with in the struggle against the hegemonism. 4

This is perhaps a unique aspect Mao Tsetung added to the theory
of international relations. The dialectical analysis solved the
ambivalence and difficulty which had hitherto existed in China's
"agonizing appraisal" of the second world.

China's Policy Goals

4

Beijing Review Nov.4, 1977.
52

Specifically, China had three distinct foreign policy
interests in the second world: global balance of influence,
strategic security, and defense modernization, in that order of
importance. Politically, the second world stood between the first
world and the third world, or, in a narrower sense, between the
superpowers and China, and was thus vital to both of them.
Hitherto, the superpowers had dealt with the Chinese, the
Europeans, and the Japanese as discrete entities, often at odds
with each other, and not as independent actors pursuing joint
foreign policy interests within a loose framework of cooperation.
The strengthening of Sino-second world relations would certainly
pose a difficulty for both of the superpowers on the one hand
and, on the other, give themselves(the medium powers) greater
scope as important actors in their own light. In either case, for
China, a good Sino-second world relation would be a powerful
thwart to the superpowers' plan to isolate her.

Thus, China

would naturally expect that the second world would be more
independent, separated from the United States and opposed to the
Soviet Union.
Militarily, both Western Europe and Japan occupy geographical
positions that would directly affect China's security interests.
Western Europe stood on the frontline between the United states
and the Soviet Union, both of whom considered Europe as their
frontline and target of contention. An independent Europe would,
thus, mean no less than a thorn in both of their sides. While the
United states might feel it was losing the most with Europe's
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"independence",

much of Soviets' military forces would also be

pinned down in the European theatre if Europe were made friendly
to China.

Japan was yet another case of this nature. She was the

most important ally of the United states in the Pacific, lying at
the east gate of China and standing in the way of the Soviets'
southward aspirations. From a strategic point of view, none of
the three great powers could afford to lose her for the global
balance of power in the long run. In the short run, suffice it to
say that if Japan were made independent, China would be relieved
of much immediate military pressure.
Thirdly, better relations with the second world would provide
China with the advanced weapons and technology required to bring
her defense to modern standards. One of the major weaknesses of
China, in comparison with the superpowers, was the backwardness
of her weaponry. To improve her international position
fundamentally, China had to build up her weapon industry and
military forces, in addition to manipulating a shift in the
balance of political influnce. Western Europe and Japan were the
only sources available at the time. The importance of the second
world to China was nowhere made more clear than by Deng Xiaoping
in one of his speeches on the prospects of Sino-Japanese
relations,
If China and Japan could cooperate with each other,
they could support half the Heaven. 5
If Japan and Western Europe fit admirably into the
5Hsueh.

Ibid. p.45.
54

scheme of China's foreign policy, then how well did China fit the
need of the Europeans and the Japanese?

This is an equally

important question, for without their consent Mao Tsetung's
dialectical reasoning is merely an elusive speculation. Without
doubt, neither Japan nor Western Europe could expect to gain as
much as China in improving their relations. Nevertheless, they
still had political, strategic, and economic interests in the
undertaking. In the first place, the Europeans were also seeking
changes in the existing international political structure at the
time. They were aspiring for autonomy from the United States on
the one hand and were opposed to Soviet pressure on the other. In
this sense, they were riding on the same boat with China. Placed
in the political context of balance of influence, China was
certainly the most effective tool of their deterrence against the
Soviet Union and the heaviest counter of their bargaining with
the United States. For not withstanding the temporary fact that
China was still a secondary player on the global stage, her
potential to rise to quasi-superpower status would augument the
international weight of her partners. In the second place,
better relations with China would provide Europe with an enormous
economic market. While the Europeans had only a limited need for
the products of China, the Chinese maintained a large demand for
European industrial commodities. Looked at from these
perspectives, just as China needed the cooperation of the second
world to help her break out of political encirclement and further
increase her role in the balance of power, the second world found
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China an equally "objective ally" in their search for a new and
expanded role in rapidly changing international environment. 6

The Instruments of Policy

Against this general background, we can now analyze a few
representative cases to see how China's political and strategic
calculations were translated into her policy actions.

In short,

China's typical approach to the second world is to drive wedges
between them and the superpowers. In an article published by the
New China News Agency on August 15, 1972, the peak of the
monetary crisis in the Western world, the author commented on the
differences between the United states and

Western Europe in the

following manner,
The United states, by making the most of its position,
hopes to force the West European countries into
sacrificing their own economic interests to preserve
the dollar's position, weakening daily, and to maintain
the dollar's privileged status as a reserve currency in
the capitalist world. This tactic has provoked the
Western European countries' sharp displeasure. 7
The purpose of these comments was unquestionable: it was to
invite frictions between Western Europe and the United states and
to encourage rebellion of the former against the latter. In a
time of two years during that period, the Peking press devoted
much space to explaining the significance of those antagonisms

6

Hsueh. Ibid. p.100.

7

Alain Bouc "Peking now wants a United Europe" The Atlantic
Community Quarterly Vol X, summer 1972. pp.167-173.
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and reported regularly on European developments. "It pounced
gleefully on the increased frequency of disagreements and
savoured the memory of the 'steel war', the 'oil war', the 'wheat
war' and the 'chicken war'. 118
Among all of China's second world connections, France was
most telling of the nature of this relationship. France was the
first European country to break official relations with Taiwan; 9
she was the most insistent on the devaluation of the dollar; and
she was the only one that declared withdrawal from the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Needless to say, the French steps

were not taken with the intention to facilitate China's
diplomatic endeavours. Neither De Gaulle nor Mao Tsetung, as
could be observed in China's vehement assault on French
imperialism and colonialism in Indochina, hedged much sentiment
about each other. But at all events, both sides saw immediate
advantages in establishing good mutual relations. For China, a
good relationship with France---a developed European country--would mean a diplomatic breakthrough in the Western line. It
would, thus, entail great symbolic significance to her political
status in international relations. For France, on the other side,
it would quite dramatically underline her new-found independence
with respect to her American custodian, and it would open up a

8Alain

Bouc. Ibid. p.169.

9

Though Britain was the first European country to recognize
the PRC, she also maintained a consulate on the island of Taiwan
and her embassy in Beijing was led by a charge d'affair instead
of an ambassador.
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great market for her booming economy.In the eyes of some
observers, the relations between Beijing and Paris elaborated "a
median line of strategy"---one of independence and development in
the face of the Soviet-American mutual understanding about the
post-war world political structure." 10 In fact, the announcement
of the establishment of Sino-Franch diplomatic relations in 1964
provoked outrage in Washington and displeasure in Moscow.
China's attitude toward the European Community developed
almost along the same latitude. In the beginning, European
integration and the establishment of the Common Market were
viewed in Peking as

negative outcomes of the contradictions

among capitalist countries and a new intrigue to exploit
underdeveloped nations. But Mao Tsetung stopped short at this
point in his ideological imagination: he did not extend his
contradiction theory to predict an automatic collapse of the
capitalist world due to the internal split of Western Europe.
Instead, his dialectics led him to reason from the reverse side
and made him believe that if these countries wanted to increase
their autonomy in decision-making, they must fight the big
powers' hegemony, form new groups, and possibly achieve distinct
political unity. With De Gaulle's ever-growing demand for
"independence" and the rapid ascendence of the European Community
in economic affairs, Mao Tsetung recognized

Western Europe as a

"third force" of international politics. China thus began to
support further European integration and emphasized the
10

Hsueh. Ibid. p.88.
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collective power of Europe in counterbalancing superpowers. As
New China emphasized on the admission of Great Britain into the
Community,
a Common Market of ten countries would surpass the
United States in gold reserves, steel and automobile
production, and exports: "This new situation in Western
Europe would be a serious obstacle to the US-USSR
hegemony in Europe. 11
Thus

Sino-EC relations expanded concurrently with the bilateral

relations with its respective members.
The normalization of the Sino-Japanese relationship is even
more delicate and subtle than that of Sino-France or Sino-EC. At
the time of normalization in September 1972, Japan's prime
minister, Tanaka, proposed that a number of agreements on
technical aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, such as aviation,
trade, shipping and fishery, be concluded. But the Chinese
premier, Chou En-lai, dismissed them as mere "trifles". Instead,
he proposed that the two governments sign a political protocol
which was to include an anti-hegemony clause before they set to
discuss operational agreements. The relevant questions concerning
this abnormal procedure was again part of China's concerns about
Japan's role in the world balance of influnce.
Along with political relations, trade relations between China
and the second world also witnessed enormous expansion during
this period. In 1970, the trade volume between China and Western
Europe reached $1,427 millions, doubling that between China and

11

Alain Bouc. Ibid. p.173.
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the whole East Bloc. Trade with the then ten members of the
European Community alone amounted to $604 millions.
Although the differences in scale and conditions with the
second world were considerable, the diplomatic recognition of the
Peking government by the second world enabled China to achieve
significant influence vis-a-vis the superpowers. Viewed in
retrospect, it was the second world connection that ultimately
elevated China onto the world stage of powers. The event produced
a clear moral: in international politics, when an influential
force is neither friend nor enemy, the best policy is to win it
over, or at least not to alienate it. Although it sounds a little
Machiavallian, it is dangerous to make judgements in white and
black.
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Chapter

v:

A New Reality, A New Phase

If China's foreign policy in the 1960s and the early part of
the 1970s was obsessed with courting the support of the third
world to counterbalance the United States and the Soviet Union,
the turn of the 1970s saw a dramatic movement

toward cooperation

with the United states. By 1979, China and the United States
signed 15 bilateral agreements on trade, culture, science and
technology, claims/assets, and even military cooperation. General
consulates were opened in each other's major cities; American
military jets were sold to Chinese armies and Chinese
intelligence-gathering stations were used by American personnel;
Chinese scholars and scientists were trained in American research
institutes and American commodities were shipped in large
quantity into Chinese ports.

Above all, the defence ministers of

the two countries frequently exchanged state visits. 1 What is the
significance of this cooperation for Chinese foreign policy?

Is

it an expansion of or a deviation from the three world policy?

1

In 1979, Chinese vice premier Deng Xiaoping and defense
minister Geng Biao visited the United States and American vice
president Walter Mondale and defense secretary Harold Brown
visited China. 308 official Chinese delegations came to the
United States while 40,000 Americans toured China. 700 Chinese
students and visiting scholars were admitted into American
research institutions. Bilateral trade between the two countries
amounted to 2 billions dollars, an increase of 200 times from
that of 1972. see Chun-tu Hsueh's statistics in China's Foreign
Relations p.34.

The United states As A Force of strategic Deterrence Against the
soviet Union
The answer to these questions again rests on the changes in
the international environment that surrounded China and the
changes in China's domestic needs. The end of the 1960s saw great
changes in the international configuration of power. Among these
changes was the shift in the scale of balance of power between
the two superpowers: the relative decline of the United States
and the continuing expansion of the Soviet Union. While the
United States, with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine,
gradually softened her past containment policy, the Soviet Union
not only refused China's conciliatory gesture2 but intensified
her involvement in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, culminating
in her invasion of Afghanistan and alignment with Vietnam against
China. The stark reality dawned upon the Chinese that although
the United states was still a superpower, the threat to China's
security largely derived from the Soviet Union and that the
withdrawal of US military forces from Asia would, in effect,
result in an absence of deterrence against the Soviet Union in
the region.
On the other hand, China's growing political and military
capacity enhanced her position to be an important force in the
global balance of power. While she still lacked sufficient power-

2

In 1975, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai suggested to his
Soviet counterpart an agreement to prevent armed conflict on the
border and to disengage the two nations' armed forces in the
disputed area along the Ussuri River.
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--both military and economic ---to compete with either the United
States

or the Soviet Union in global diplomacy, her enhanced

diplomatic status, her political influence with the third world,
and, above all, her gradually expanded military capability had
lifted her into the position of a quasi-superpower. The United
States, out of global strategic considerations, began to change
her posture toward China. She not only denounced "hegemonism" in
the Shanghai communique signed with China in 1972, 3 but endorsed
some of China's military actions in South Asia. In short, the
United states began to consider China a strategic force in
international relations, especially in her relations with the
Soviet Union.
All these factors contributed to fundamental alterations in
China's perception of the world situation and her role in
international affairs. The entire world system, in the Chinese
view, though still essentially bipolar, had undergone significant
alterations in the direction of multipolarity. The fathers of
realpolitik prescribed for later politicians two rules: that the
foreign policies of a nation, especially those of a great power,
are made in calculation for the maximizing of power and national
interests, and that in the game of balance of power, the balancer
must shift alignment constantly, but always in support of the

3

According to Chun-tu Huseh, one of the subjects of Deng
Xiaoping's negotiation in Washington in 1979 was America's
endorsement of China's actions against Vietnam. see Chun-tu
Huseh's China's Foreign Relations
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weak to weaken the strong. 4 The case of Sino-American cooperation
evolved exactly along these dimensions. Both sides perceived
different opportunities and threats in the new interactions and
especially in the relative shift in the balance of power between
the two superpowers. Both sides saw common interests in
cooperating with each other at this point of time. At bottom, the
Chinese leaders were concerned about the stability of China's
surroundings in Asia in face of the unrelenting buildup of the
Soviet military and political pressure throughout China's
periphery and were increasingly aware of the absence of strategic
deterrence left by the withdrawal of the American forces from the
region. The top priority for China's foreign policy, therefore,
had become to heighten the US-Soviet antipathy or to promote
cooperation between China and the United States to check the
Soviet expansion. As the former Chinese foreign minister Huang
Hua was reported to have said,
By winning the United States over, we could concentrate all
our forces to deal with the archenemy---revisionist Soviet
social-imperialism5

Once these assumptions were made, the reasoning behind the
original differentiation of the three worlds became too natural
to be refuted in the formulation of China's new policy
respectively toward the United States and the Soviet Union. A
content analysis of China's policy statements published in Peking
4

see Cohen Realpolitik: Theory and Practice.

5

Hsiung and Kim China In the Global Community. p.221
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Review from 1972 to 1978 indicates that China had by that time
not only abandoned the theme of superpower collusion, but had
begun to emphasize contradictions and distinctions between the
two rivals. A typical illustration is Deng Xiaoping's remark made
during his visit to Washington in 1979,
the root of unrest is in the contention for world
hegemony between the two superpowers ••• but for quite
some time, the Soviet Union is on the offensive,
whereas the United states is on the defensive •.• The
Soviet social-imperialism is the most dangerous source
of war. 6

Like the second world whose contradictions with the first world
could be exploited to counterbalance the latter, the United
states could be a force of the united international front in
opposition to the archenemy, the Soviet Union. Thus in spite of
their fundamental differences in ideology, social values, and
political and economic systems, China found grave common concerns
with the United states on a wide range of international issues
such as the Soviet military incursion into Asia and Europe, the
Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and
Soviet strategic ambitions in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.
As the United States took "the China connection"as a cornerstone
in her global strategy, China considered "the American
connection" a powerful guarantee of her security. As Huan Xiang,
the late director of China's strategic centre, explained, the

6

see Beijing Review Feb. 16, 1979. p. 18.
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gist of China's three world strategy, as it entered the late
1970s, had been that
Soviet social-imperialism is pushing a hegemonist policy of
aggression and expansion and its spearhead is directed not
only to the third World, and at the group of industrialized
nations, primarily Japan and Western Europe(the second
world] but more importantly right at the United states ..•
and for the sake of safe-guarding world peace, all the
countries and people opposed to Soviet expansion should
united and wage a tit-for-tat struggle against soviet
hegemonism. " 7

The United States As A source Of Modernization

Paralleling her security and political concerns, there was
another calculation that drove China toward cooperation with the
United states: the desire for modernization. In contrast with the
radicals, the so-called Gang of Four, who put ideological
advancement ahead of everything else, the reform-minded
leadership that came into power after Mao Tsetung's death took
economic development as the priority of their administration. At
the Eleventh Party Congress, Hua Guofeng, then chairman of the
party, declared,
We must build up an independent and fairly comprehensive
industrial and economic system in our country by 1980. By
then, farming must be basically mechanized,considerable
increases in production must be made in agriculture,
forestry, animal husbandry, side line production and
fishery •.• [To realize this goal, China must] learn the
strong points of all nations and countries, to learn from
them all that is truly good in politics, economics, military
affairs, science, technology, literature and arts. 8
7

Huan Xinag "On Sino-US Relations" in Foreign Affairs
Fall/1981.pp.35-53.
8

Hua Guofeng, "Political Report To the 11th National
Congress of the CCP" Peking Review August 26,1977, p.50.
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At the first mention of this program, it might sound strange
to casual observers of Chinese politics and indeed to some
Chinese themselves that China, a country so much possessed by
desires to change the international status quo,

would open

herself up and embark on economic cooperation with the West. The
fact is, however, that since modernization is a major indicator
of power status and the world view of the Chinese people is such
as described before, modernization had always been one of the
central concerns to the Chinese leadership. As a matter of fact,
the politics of modern China since 1949 had focused primarily,
although not exclusively, on how China could be transformed as
rapidly as possible into an industrialized nation, equal to
nations on the forefront of technological development. As early
as when the first Constitution of the PRC was drafted, Mao
Tsetung had declared,
Our general objective is to strive to build a great
socialist country ••. How long will it take to accomplish
socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation
and mechanization of agriculture and make China a great
socialist country? We won't set a rigid time limit now. It
will probably take a period of three five-year plans, or
fifteen years, to lay the foundation. I think for us to
build a great socialist country, about fifty years, or even
ten five-year plans, will probably be enough .•• 9

The plan was not put into implementation for two reasons. On
the one hand, there was a lack of unity among the leaders about
9

Mao Tsetung "On the Draft Constitution of the People's
Republic of China, June 14,1954" Selected Works Vol. V (Peking:
foreign Language Press, 1977) pp.141-2
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the relationship between self-reliance and open-door strategy.
Policies and programs for modernization vacillated from one model
to another, resulting in a long period of inaction. On the other
hand, the threatening international environment did not foster a
congenial climate for China to undertake modernization programs.
Rather than concentrating on economic construction, China had to
devote her major attention to gathering the support of the third
world to break out of the diplomatic encirclement imposed by the
superpowers.
The improvement of Sino-us relations and the fall of the Gang
of Four ushered China into "a new historical period." In the
first place, the United States' cooperation with China on
international issues relieved China of her preoccupation with
security matters. With the soviet Union continuing to be China's
major threat and at the same time NATO's major antagonist, the
strategic force of the United States and her allies was a de
facto deterrent to the Soviet expansion to Asia.

The Soviet

Union could not attack China without transferring some of her
forces from Europe to Asia. This had been made impossible by the
constraints of the United States. Secondly, China's leadership
had achieved relative unity in their views on the relationships
between superstructure and economic foundations, and between
international position and domestic development. Both Hua Guofeng
and Deng Xiaoping frankly admitted that China was lagging behind
some of the advanced countries, such as the United States, by as
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much as fifty years, 10 and that to catch up China needed both to
learn from the advanced nations and to develop her own scientific
capacities. In short, as Michael Oksenberg observed, the reformminded leadership had three new visions about the contemporary
internatonal situation which he termed as "confident
nationalism". 11 First, they believed that the international
status of a nation would ultimately depend on her comprehensive
national capability and economic development in particular;
second, they believed that the current international setting
permitted China to concentrate on her domestic construction; and
third, they believed that China could benefit from effective
participation in the international economic system and her
modernization needed the positive cooperation of the West.
Different environments posed different opportunities for
China, and, to be sure, different objectives would also require
different strategies and tactics. 12 In this schematic design, it
is quite clear, particularly when looked at from the economic and
technical point of view, what role China was going to assign
respectively to the third world, the second world and the first

° C.H. G. Oldham "Science and Technological Policies" China's
Developmental Experience, Michael Oksenberg, ed.
(Praeger:NY,1973) pp.80-94.
1

11

Michael Oksenberg "China's Confident Nationalism" in
Foreign Affairs winter/1986.p.156.
12

Classical scholars such as Rousseau and Grotius argue that
because "actors touch each other at so many points" their
behaviours could be understood as a complex pattern of
action/reaction in which individual acts serve as feedback for
targets---Ferguson.p.194.
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world. Two reasons are obvious why China would have to adjust her
previous posture toward them. One is that a corollary of the four
modernization program is a recognition of China's technological
backwardness. To improve that situation, China had to undertake
scientific exchange programs to train her scientists abroad to
raise the level of scientific knowledge at home. She would also
have to import large quantities of advanced industrial techniques
and to transfer the most advanced technologies. As her practice
in the following years indicates, a major part of China's
strategy was to open joint research projects and to purchase
complete industrial plants from abroad, the so-called "turn-key"
projects. Given the fact that advanced technology was almost
monopolized in the United states, Western Europe and Japan, these
countries would certainly draw more and more attention from
China's policy makers. In fact, Japan, the United states, and
Western Europe have been for years China's three largest trade
partners.
Secondly, the program called for an intimate political
relationship with the United States. Although the world order was
moving increasingly into multipolarity, the United States was
still the political, economic and military leader of the West. It
ran the biggest economy, possessed the most advanced technology,
and above all remained the strongest member, if not the leader,
of the "Group of Seven", the GATT, the Paris Organization, and
the World Bank, etc .•

To some extent she influenced the

decisions of other Western nations. If China was to have the
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economic and technical cooperation of the West, she must first
obtain the political endorsement of the United States.
All these factors, on the other hand, considerably downplayed
the political role of the third world in China's global strategy.
Although the third world was still professed in China's policy
pronouncements as the basic focus of China's overall foreign
policy, for some time it had been, in fact, China's periphery
concern. Obviously, the third world, with whom China had so far
identified herself, could neither provide the technology and
investment China's modernization program required, nor could
China, upon whom third world countries had so far laid
expectations, afford to divest herself any more to support them.
In one instance of departure, China organized a commercial
engineering company which was comprised of many former foreignaid personnel to build bridges, water-supply projects, and
railways in third world countries. As one article in the

Beijing

Review said, China had always supported the construction of the
third world countries, but as China was going through economic
adjustment herself, she had to reduce the scale of her
international assistance. 13 The diminished importance of the
third world in Chinese global policy was also evident in the
sharp decline of the People's Daily's coverage of the NIEO, a
conceptual and normative linkage between China and the third

13 Beijing

Review

Feb.16,1986.
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world in what Samuel Kim calls global ecopolitics. 14 The trend
promised that as China's modernization program heightened in
scale and her interactions with the Western countries increased,
her relations with the third world would be increasingly
restrained within the boundaries of moral support, if not a total
reversal of her role from champion to competitor. In the view of
Lilian

c. Harris, China had already begun to face credibility

problems with the third world countries and would probably be
burdened by negative political implications in the long run as
the developed countries had been in the past. 15

14

Samuel Kim "China and the third world in NIEO Politics" in
Contemporary China 3, winter/1979.
u Lillian c. Harris China and the Third World:Champion or
Challenger Auburn House: 1986. p.5.
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Assessment

Now China is at another crossroad. After the Tiananmen
Incident of 1989, the government of China is once again faced
with diplomatic isolation. The Western industrialized countries,
led by the Group of Seven, have declared that they would not
resume normal relations with China unless her government
continues to undertake political and economic liberalization.
Thus, she is now fast caught in the dilemma of having to choose
between giving up her communist ideology to go along with the
world trend or to resist the West and be cut off from the
international political and economic system. Just as when the
communists came into power in 1949, China has again to answer the
question of where to go.
In Beijing, the view has been that the diplomatic isolation,
though damaging to China's international image, will not last
long, because her large market is so attractive that computer and
other industrial manufacturers will be compelled to come back
into China. The dynamic Pacific Rim economies, in particular,
with their large foreign exchange earnings and rising labour
costs at home, will not be able to wait long before seeking
outlets in China for their export industries and capital. Thus,
as long as China remains receptive to such investment, the
attempts at diplomatic isolation will not succeed. The priority

of China's current foreign policy, accordingly, is to sustain her
diplomatic vitality by means of reviving diplomatic relations
with the third world and to wait for opportunities to break the
weak link in the Western line.
Evidence from the last two years suggests that China is
retreading her past road of the three worlds. During the last two
years,

her president, premier and foreign minister have paid

frequent visits to such countries as Pakistan, Burma, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Mexico, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina and so on. China has
made initiatives to reestablish diplomatic relations with
Indonesia and Singapore, and has also moved in the direction of
normalizing relations with Vietnam, Laos and Cuba. Clearly, China
is again hoping to use the third world as a source of diplomatic
leeway and as a counter-point against the perceived Western
attempts of diplomatic isolation.
Those attempts may in some degree ease her diplomatic
difficulty as they have in the past, and, indeed, as business
news from China on ventures by Japan's NEC and America's IBM and
Boeing suggest, China may be succeeding on that score. The
dilemma is, nevertheless, a fast knot. Unlike her struggles in
the past, which were aimed to overthrow the international status
quo of the time, she is now caught between the functional
requirements of modernization, as defined in the mainstream
thinking in the world's advanced capitalist countries, and the
normative requirements of Marxism, which are the premise of her
political existence. Because she had already attained the
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international status she desired, and because she does not have
the intention to upset the present international political and
economic system, there does not exist the question of standing
with one world against another. Instead, China knows very well
what the USA MFN status, the World Bank loans, and the Japanese
investment mean to her political and economic existence.

For

example, as soon as the G-7 made its political declaration in the
November of 1989, Deng Xiaoping stressed to his subordinates that
"China must return to the world stage. " 1 These considerations
will limit China's foreign behaviour to a very pragmatic design.
Thus, while it is still not clear how China is going to clear the
mud---what policies she is going to carry toward the third world
and the industrialized capitalist countries---it is certain that
her revived interest in the third world will not last long and
that her principal thrust is again to regain her diplomatic
status among the major countries of the world.
All in all,

i~

spite of the current uncertainties in China's

foreign policy behaviour, two conclusions may be safely drawn
from the above analysis. One is that her foreign policy is built
upon the premise of realpolitik, in spite of her value-laden
rhetoric; the other is that her foreign policy undergoes constant
shifts in order to better adjust to the external environment.
During the first phase, from 1960 to 1970, the dominant value of
China's global policy had been to break out of the diplomatic
1

The content of the talk was circulated within the
government, but not published---author.
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encirclement set by the first world and to increase her political
influence in the international community. Being a much weaker
nation, both in military power and economic capability, the three
world strategy enabled China to make capital of her very
weakness. By disclaiming any superpower ambitions and by
championing the cause of the poor and the proud, she was able to
form a grand coalition in opposition. The 1970s, however, saw
China moving ambiguously back and forth between the three worlds.
The triangular relationship with the two superpowers permitted
her to play upon the persisting tensions and divisions between
the United States and the Soviet Union and, with the support of
her growing capability, to act as a balancer between the two
competing powers. The 1980s saw China move further away from the
third world and closer to the industrial West. In order to gain
the advanced technology and capital investment her modernization
program needed, she undertook all-out cooperation with the United
States and other Western industrialized countries. And finally,
in the last two years, when her relations with the West suffered
decline and faced another diplomatic isolation, she again turned
to the third world. The following diagrams show how China's
relations with the three worlds have changed during the past
forty years in light of the changes in the world's political
situation.
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In every one of the above cases, by the very nature of the
three world differentiation, China attempted and was often able
to thwart the threatening options available to her antagonists.
To put it more straightforwardly, in the game against the first
world, the three world strategy allowed China to play the cards
of the third and second worlds, and, in the game against her
archenemy, she played the card of one superpower against the
other. Neither the cooling of her attitude toward the third world
nor the warming of her relations with the first and second
worlds, therefore, indicates China's abandonment of the three
world strategy. They merely suggest the different dimensions and
dialectics along which the doctrine is operated in practice.
Above all, it is not difficult to discern that the concerns with
the third world and, to some extent the second world, at best
have a secondary role to play in determining China's approach to
foreign affairs. China's foreign policy is based primarily on her
perceived need for stability, security, and development, a policy
that depends chiefly on China's relations with the United states
and the Soviet Union.
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